Our Future in Iraq

The war in Iraq has been costly in terms of life and money, that much is beyond dispute. The question that our nation is facing is what to do from this point. Unfortunately, the answer will not easily break down along political party lines because the road to whatever success we can derive from this experience will cost the country more time, more lives, and more commitment to Iraq.

There are some facts that we must face up to: 1) as Colin Powell warned President Bush before the start of the Iraq war, "if we break it, we own it;" the problems in Iraq are ours to fix. 2) Precipitous withdraw from Iraq, i.e. leaving before the "job is done," would be disastrous for the region. 3) Clear, realistic goals must formulated and met before our departure.

Many experts agree that significant troop levels must be maintained in Iraq through at least 2012, probably to 2018, to continue to succeed in suppressing insurgency and sectarian violence. Costs for continuing to rebuild critical infrastructure such as electrical generation and distribution, clean drinking water, government buildings and other logistics support resources, and oil production and distribution facilities will likely be hundreds of billions of dollars. But these costs are a big political and economic pill for politicians and the public to swallow.

But sticking it out in Iraq might be more beneficial in the long run than many estimate or the economic costs suggest. First, it could usher in a new era in American foreign policy. Many decry American foreign policy because it is too interventionist when it comes to the internal workings of foreign nations that disagree with American interests and their pursuits. At the same time, many criticize American foreign policy for not intervening enough to aid in solution to problems that the U.S. helps to create. Staying in Iraq could demonstrate to a skeptical part of the world that we are willing to help clean up the mess that we created by our covert and overt involvement in the region since the early 1950's. Practically, that means helping to rebuild critical infrastructure, avoiding excessive interference with the democratic process in Iraq (even if we do not like the outcomes), a commitment to not turn Iraq into an excuse for military presence in the region, and high-level negotiations with surrounding countries to promote diplomatic trust and exchange.

Second, staying there for the long haul could teach a painful but invaluable lesson to the Congress: that feeble, ambiguous resolutions and hopes for the best are not ways to live up to the responsibility of being the preeminent constitutional power. While the President is the Commander-in-Chief of military forces, he is not the sole underwriter of projects as momentous as invading a country, deposing its sovereign government, and attempting to instigate the growth of a democracy. The Congress should have insisted on its oversight role in the planning for Iraq before authorizing war. The fact it didn't does not excuse it from dealing with the consequences of poor planning by precipitously withdrawing from the mess it authorized. The Congress should generate a non-partisan coalition to seriously assess short and long term military and civil plans for the region.

Lastly, the American public can learn that it too is responsible for Iraq in that its consent was not informed but inflamed by the emotions of 9/11. The public is the ultimate adjudicator of this country's leadership and to let ourselves be swept away by nationalist fervor, factional myopia, or thirst for revenge abdicates our responsibility to hold leaders responsible. The public should pause when feeling cavalier about foreign invasions because though public sentiments may change quickly, the policies underwritten by them do not. The public should seriously consider the presidential candidates' military and civil plans for Iraq before casting their ballots.

Ultimately, this is a case of not believing the truth of the dictum, caveat emptor. Though the decision to buy into this war in Iraq was almost undoubtedly unwise, limited successes and practical lessons for future policy and civic responsibility can of course be drawn. The real question is whether America has the resources to cover the check we wrote to buy this war, this occupation, this future.